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The Perils and Promise of Teaching Margaret Montoya’s
Máscaras Article in the First Year Law School Curriculum
Christian G. Fritz*

A Reflection on Margaret Montoya, Máscaras, Trenzas, y Greñas:
Un/Masking the Self While Un/Braiding Latina Stories and Legal
Discourse, 17 HARV. WOMEN’S L. J. 185 (1994), 15 CHICANO-LATINO L.
REV. 1 (1994)
Margaret Montoya’s article Máscaras, Trenzas y Greñas:
Un/Masking the Self While Un/Braiding Latina Stories and Legal
Discourse1 is rightly considered an icon in the literature of Critical Race
Theory. Twenty years after its publication it continues to offer insights and
serves as a quintessential example of the power of personal narrative to
decode embedded assumptions and structural features of law. Montoya’s
article is built, in part, on John Noonan’s insight, in Persons and Masks of
the Law (1976), about the tendency of legal discourse to obscure or mask
the humanity that underlies all case law.2 While Noonan looked at the more
generic “masking” tendencies of the law, Montoya connected that process
with the more specific project of “racing” the law through a mediation of
her experience as a Latina first year law student at Harvard. The result was
a powerful piece that has ongoing relevance to the jurisprudential theories
seeking to describe and better understand the interior connections of race
and law. At the same time the article provides a critique that predictably
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raises the hackles of readers who are unfamiliar with or who might discount
some of the basic premises of Critical Race Theory.
I suspect that most of the readers of the Máscaras article—
particularly those teaching in law schools and who assign the Máscaras
article to their students—do so in the context of a second or third year
elective course or seminar. As such, the law students who encounter the
article are invariably a self-selected group composed of people who have an
interest in, or at least have some intellectual curiosity about, the
implications of race and the law. In many cases they may well already be
persuaded by the literature of which Máscaras forms a part. A different
audience for the article—a tougher crowd perhaps—would be composed of
first year students reading the piece as part of a mandatory course. In this
comment, I share my experience in teaching the Máscaras article to every
entering class of the University of New Mexico law school since 2005—
aided by the article’s author, Margaret Montoya. That experience highlights
the challenges of introducing Professor Montoya’s article to first year law
students, but also suggests the value and powerful force of sharing
Máscaras with students at the start of their legal career.
First, some background is needed to place in context the experience
of teaching Máscaras and the viability of doing so as part of the first year
law school curriculum. In 1987 the faculty of the University of New Mexico
law school decided to introduce a required component of legal history into
the Fall semester of its first year curriculum and hired me to develop such a
course. Initially entitled “Historical Introduction to Law,” the course and
the materials developed for it reflected the title: an initial exposure to the
historical context of the common law. Gradually, however, the focus of the
course evolved and by Fall 2005, when the Máscaras article was first added
to the course materials, the course had been renamed “Comparative and
Historical Legal Perspectives” (CHLP). In this iteration, and continuing up
to the present, CHLP has the objective of helping the entering class develop
effectiveness and proficiency as law students and ultimately lawyers. A dual
approach is used to advance this intensely practical objective of CHLP
notwithstanding the use of readings that inevitably strike the students as
very different from the sources being used to learn the “law” in their other
first year classes.
The first approach is to help students develop an appreciation of the
intrinsic nature, characteristics, and particularities of the common law
tradition—what might be called the development of a “legal cultural
competency” in that legal tradition. American law students are invariably
told that the principal objective of their training and education is to be able
“to think like a lawyer.” While this platitude has an element of truth, it is, of
course, not strictly accurate and begs a corrective. The statement should be
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modified to assert that American law students need “to think like a
(common law) lawyer.” A reminder that the legal system students are being
trained to enter is derived from a particular legal tradition underscores the
easily overlooked fact that there are significantly different understandings
of the nature of “law” and the role that lawyers and judges play within a
host of other cultures and legal traditions. For law students, acquiring the
capacity to “think like a lawyer” in the common law tradition is akin to
developing fluency in a new and complex language. The ability to
communicate effectively and persuasively rests on a mastery of vocabulary,
grammar, syntax as well an appreciation of subtleties of pronunciation,
context, dialects, and specialized argot. CHLP challenges students to
immerse themselves and develop a sophisticated understanding of the
conventions and byways of particular legal culture within which American
lawyers and judges operate. Acquiring such a “legal cultural competence,”
it is asserted, is crucial to the effectiveness of would-be practitioners within
the American legal tradition.
The second approach in helping students develop into effective
legal practitioners involves instilling a critical and self-conscious approach
to the study and understanding of law. Such a critical perspective is needed
to resist the tendency of students to take what they are encountering for
granted, as something that is inevitable and inexorable. I offer the metaphor
that first year law students (under the conventional pedagogy followed by
American law schools) are dropped into an ocean of “law” where they
quickly encounter a bewildering array of strange denizens in that watery
legal world and in which they are largely left to their own devices to
navigate and understand. Notwithstanding the fact that as sentient creatures
law students know they have been dropped in this ocean, there is a strong
tendency to lose sight of this fact and begin to take the process of legal
education and the content of law for granted and at face value. Much like
the air we breathe, the legal “water” that surrounds first year law students
can easily become invisible to their eyes. CHLP challenges students to
become “flying fish” who rise above the legal sea they find themselves in
and attain a critical perspective from which they are encouraged to ask what
they are doing in their other first year classes, how they are doing it, and
why they are doing it. In addition to becoming critical consumers of their
legal education, students are urged to embrace the central insight and legacy
of legal realism: that legal rules and doctrines are not inevitable, that law
rests on underlying and often implicit assumptions, reflects particular
values, and ultimately is a construct that is shaped, not something that is
inexorably or neutrally developed. Developing a self-critical mindset in
their approach to studying law is the essence of the call for first year law
students to strive to become “flying fish.”
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CHLP seeks to advance these dual approaches in five interrelated
units of readings. The first unit provides an overview of the common law
and civil law tradition and starts with three appellate judicial opinions
drawn from the highest civil court in France, the highest civil court in
Germany, and from the Michigan Supreme Court. All three courts address
an identical issue (the applicability of the principle of joint and several
liability in the context of a tort suit) and each reaches the same result in
applying the principle. Even so, the form of the judicial opinions varies
widely. Considering the judicial opinions as “artifacts” of the legal systems
that produced them—the first two from the civil law tradition and the last
from the common law tradition—offers dramatic contrasts in terms of
length, sources of law relied upon, and the nature of judicial persona and
argumentation. Differences in the shape of the opinions invite an
exploration of how the history and nature of the civil law tradition helps
account for the shape of the French and German opinions. Although the first
unit serves to introduce students to the civil law tradition, the purpose of the
comparative approach is to highlight features of the Michigan decision that
are characteristic of the common law approach to judicial law-making and
that students might otherwise take for granted. The Michigan case serves as
a typical example of the appellate opinions that form the staple of what
students are reading for their other classes, but allows them to reflect upon
how the American opinion suggests a different world-view of the nature of
law and the legitimate sources of law.
The second CHLP unit turns to selected aspects of the history of the
common law tradition, including the unification of law in England through
the rise of the royal or central courts operating under the writ system and
the emergence of the court of Chancery, along with the legacy of the
law/equity distinction and the ultimate procedural “merger” of law and
equity. The readings dealing with medieval English legal developments and
American law reform in the 19th century do not pretend to offer an
overview of English and American legal history. Rather, they serve as a
means through which students can identify contributing factors that have
shaped the common law tradition and imparted it with particular
characteristics and features. The comparison of the three judicial opinions
that open the class continue to provide benefits as students are able to
identify further parallels between the Michigan opinion and the appellate
opinions they are studying in criminal law, torts, and contracts.
CHLP’s unit three is entitled, “The Role of Law and Lawyers” and
shifts gears by introducing some “non-Western” concepts of law, including
dimensions of Chthonic legal traditions and Navajo justice concepts. The
unit offers the opportunity to contrast the common law and civil law
traditions with other cultural contexts in which the meaning of “law” and
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the role of lawyers—if any—is rather different from what lawyers within
either common law or civil law tradition would take for granted. This third
unit also explores expectations about law and lawyers in the American
common law tradition, the contours of an ideology of advocacy, and the
broad trends in the rise of “Alternative Dispute Resolution.” Inevitably,
cultural understandings about the nature of “law” not only shape the
potential role for lawyers, but have implications for how law is taught.
Unit four turns to the question that many first semester law students
tend to ask themselves at this point: where did the pedagogy for the legal
education they are experiencing come from? The unit permits a brief
exploration of the arc of legal education from a practical, apprentice-based
approach, exemplified by training in the Inns of Court and by “reading
law,” to a combination of academic study and apprenticeships to
Christopher Columbus Langdell’s concept of law as a “science.” Exploring
the rise of the modern law school in terms of the study of law introduced
with Langdell’s deanship at Harvard Law School in 1870 helps satisfy the
curiosity of students about the birth of the “socratic method.” At the same
time, that story permits an introduction of a jurisprudential perspective of
American law by exploring the premises, methods, and purposes of
Langdell’s legal education. The philosophy and understanding of law that
underlay Langdell’s 19th century “revolution” in legal education set the
stage for the ultimate rejection of “Langdellism” in the critiques of the
Legal Realists.
The final unit of the course, entitled “Changing Perceptions of Law
in America,” traces the emergence of the Legal Realists and some of their
intellectual heirs including the Critical Legal Studies movement, Feminist
Jurisprudence, and Critical Race Theory. Rather than an abstract discussion
of some of the schools of post-realist jurisprudential thought, the final unit
explores this thought through narratives focusing on accounts of the first
year law school experience and their significance for understanding the
nature of law. Prior to 2005, CHLP featured Duncan Kennedy’s critique of
law school as training for hierarchy as well as Ann Scales’ feminist critique
of legal education.3 After 2005, Margaret Montoya’s Máscaras was added
to round out three very personal, but different takes on legal education and
in particular each author’s reflection on the law school experience at
Harvard. The materials in the final unit inevitably trigger strong reactions
among the students, particularly as they respond to the experiences
3

Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy, in THE POLITICS OF LAW,
40 (David Kairys, ed., 1982) (critiquing the law school curriculum); Ann C. Scales,
Surviving Legal De-Education: An Outsider’s Guide, 15 VERMONT L. REV. 139 (1990)
(providing a feminist perspective on the law school curriculum and suggestions on how to
get more out of legal education).
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characterized by the authors in the light of their own experience and
reactions to their first semester of law school. The presentation of Professor
Montoya’s Máscaras article in this context has proved challenging, but it
has also provided evidence of the promise of generating candid classroom
discussion by first year law students on difficult questions raised by race
and the law.
From the time the Máscaras article was included in the course
materials, Professor Montoya has routinely given a guest lecture on the
ideas raised in Máscaras. Her presentation and the Máscaras article—along
with the Kennedy and Scales pieces—has triggered both positive and
negative reactions. Invariably some students express their gratitude for
finally hearing “their voice” and experiences echoed in the Máscaras
article, while others sometimes react skeptically and at times dismissively.
The tendency of some students, particularly white males, to react
defensively to the themes in Máscaras and thus to stifle an open
consideration of its ideas has lessened over time. Part of that tendency I
attribute to a clearer articulation of how the Máscaras article relates to
CHLP’s objective of developing among students a self-critical perspective
of law and legal education. While to some individuals the themes of
Máscaras is like “singing to the choir,” there has been a discernable shift in
the willingness of potential skeptics of its message to give it serious
consideration after emphasizing its place in the enterprise of maintaining a
self-critical perceptive about law and the legal system. The final unit—
including the Máscaras article—has worked better over the years after I
began challenging any member of the class to deny that they were not in a
real sense “post-Langdellians.” In other words, virtually no students at this
stage of the course are apt to express the view that law is inexorable, simply
destined to be and inherently neutral in nature. And I point out that if that is
not the case, then all of them have to be willing to concede the need to
examine what has shaped law and the legal system. The forces potentially
shaping law are manifold, including power, class, economics, gender, and
race, among a wealth of other things. If students are forced to acknowledge
the need to think about law in that wider critical context, there is a greater
potential for Máscaras to be seen as introducing the dimension of race and
gender as part of the development of a critical perspective rather than as a
political manifesto that speaks to a like-minded subset. It is within this
analytical framework (along with the fact that the entire first year class is
part of the discussion) that Máscaras has enormous potential to contribute
to legal education.
At the same time, because Máscaras is discussed in a session
involving the entire entering class of around 115 students, the dynamics of
personal vulnerability and risk work against meaningful and candid

Harvard Journal of Law & Gender

7

discourse. Each time Professor Montoya has given her joint lecture, we
have tried to think of ways to encourage a more open and fruitful
discussion. In the past, Professor Montoya has given her presentation
(sometimes using a power point presentation that was subsequently shared
with the class) prefaced with an invitation to ask questions during and after
the presentation. In addition, we have invited students who might have a
particular interest in the ideas of Máscaras to raise questions ahead of time
or meet with Professor Montoya before the presentation. While these
approaches were useful, they never generated the type of discussion we
both really hoped for—until, that is, Fall 2012.
At the end of last year, Professor Montoya and I met with a half
dozen students before the joint session to discuss Máscaras in anticipation
of those students serving as a volunteer panel that might help stimulate class
discussion. At that preliminary meeting someone posed the question, “How
might or could white males participate in discussing Máscaras without
themselves feeling silenced?” The underlying assumption was that the
intent of the article was not to silence white males and turn the tables on
them after years of being the dominant voice in the legal dialogue. That
question prompted a useful discussion about how hard and difficult the
questions raised by Máscaras were to discuss—particularly in a large
classroom with students speaking in front of all their peers.
What transformed this year’s presentation on Máscaras, however,
was what Professor Montoya did in class—essentially throwing away the
script of her traditional lecture presentation. Instead of describing the ideas
in the article, she asked the panel members for their personal reactions to
Máscaras. After a few of the panelists spoke, hands started raising in the
class. What ensued thereafter was a remarkable fifty-minute discussion in
which several dozens of students proved willing to express views and
experiences that took considerable personal courage. What underlay the
occasion was the tone set by Professor Montoya, who underscored the
emotional risks that make discussions of race so difficult. Her moderation
of the discussion was a tour de force that included a gentle but firm
corrective to one female student of color who expressed skepticism towards
a white male who declared himself to feel vulnerable during these kinds of
discussions. “When someone says they feel vulnerable and at risk,”
Professor Montoya said, “we need to take that concern seriously.”
Recognizing the feelings of vulnerability and acknowledging how hard it
was to share honest feelings in such a context encouraged an unprecedented
amount of student discussion. Numerous students prefaced their comments
with, “I’m going to be hated for saying this...” The poignancy and
authenticity of the conversation prompted one first-year law student to
exclaim toward the end of the session, “These are the kinds of conversations
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we should have been having from the start of the semester!” True enough, I
had to agree, but all in all, the discussion led by Professor Montoya was one
of the most remarkable conversations I have witnessed in the formal law
school classroom setting. For hours after the class was over, students
continued the discussion in the Forum outside the lecture hall, with intense
conversations among students who normally did not talk to one another.
This extraordinary exchange prompted by the reading of Máscaras
could be attributed to the fact that it was Margaret Montoya who led the
discussion of her article. However, while Professor Montoya was a truly
impressive presence in the class room that day, I believe that a
consideration of Máscaras has the potential to stimulate similar
conversations in other law schools even without her physical presence.
Placing Máscaras squarely in the context of challenging students to engage
in a critical analysis of law and their legal education, as well as frankly
acknowledging how hard it is to talk about race honestly, would seem to be
a good prescription for encouraging such discussions. The article has a
relevance that goes far beyond the literature of Critical Race Theory. In the
end, Máscaras has remarkable potential as a catalyst for discussing
important questions about the nature of law in America.

